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ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER INTEREST
Kenneth S. Carlston* and James M. Treece**
UBLIC control of business in the United States has proceeded, in
most sectors of the economy, on the assumption that free, open
competition in the market should be the primary regulator. It is felt
that consumer welfare will be maximized by such an organization of
the economy. Courts, governmental agencies, and, to a certain extent,
private agencies have performed the role of ensuring that free
markets are not displaced by other, less desirable alternatives.

P

J. PLURALISTIC COMPETITION: THE TRADITIONAL GOAL

Decision-making in the public control of business has generally
proceeded in the light of the teachings of economists concerning the
forms of competition. Perfect conditions of competition are said to
include a market with many actors, · both buyers and sellers, who
have perfect knowledge and mobility and who deal in undifferentiated items. A relatively pure form of competition is expected to
exist even where market actors have neither perfect knowledge nor
perfect mobility. 1 Less pure forms of competition result from acertain amount of product differentiation and a resulting quantum of
control-perhaps unexercised control-over price. It is generally
agreed that as the number of sellers decreases in a given market and
as the degree of product differentiation in that market increases,
there is an increasing probability that an impure form of competition is regulating market action. It is usually assumed that there
is a direct correlation between the degree to which competition in
the market in fact approaches the ideal of highly pluralistic competition and the likelihood of satisfaction of consumer wants at the lowest attainable price.2

A. Concern Over the Number of Sellers-A Case
of Misplaced Emphasis
Of all the foregoing indicators of competition, the easiest to observe in actual operation is the number of sellers in a given market.
• Professor of Law, University of Illinois.-Ed.
•• Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University.-Ed.
1. See, e.g., CHAMBERUN, Tm: THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 3-10 (7th ed.
1956).
2. Obviously there is no generally applicable definition of competition. "What is
'inter-industry' competition to one man is 'late-stage monopoly capitalism' to another."
Dewey, The Economic Theory of Antitrust: Science or Religion?, 50 VA. L. REv. 413,
4!10 (1964).
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It should come as no surprise if an agency concerned with maintaining competition in an oligopolistic market performs its task in large
part on the basis of a nose count of sellers.3 In two recent bank
merger decisions, the Supreme Court not only determined the number of sellers in the relevant market, but in large part also used
this count as the basis for its decisions to interfere and forestall permanent marketing combinations in those markets. In United States
v. First Nat'l Bank b Trust Co. (the Lexington Bank case),4 the
Court refused in a specific setting to permit a six-seller market to be
reduced to a five-seller market, and in its earlier opinion in United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,5 it identified the general market
setting in which it would assume that the loss of even one seller as
a result of a merger would constitute, actually or potentially, a substantial lessening of competition in that market.
Concern over the number of sellers in a market obviously represents, among other things, a desire that buyers be provided with a
wide choice among sellers in the market. However, the existence of
a wide range of transaction opportunities is a better guide to the
functioning of competition in a market than the mere existence of
a large number of sellers. The operation of a cartel illustrates this
point. A market characterized by many sellers operating as a cartel
offers the consumer no real choice of transaction opportunities because no seller is functioning as an independent economic unit;
rather, the managements of the several units have pooled their firms'
decision-making operations and have substituted the group or cartel
decision for their independent decisions. In the cartel situation, the
consumer has no real choice because the cartel has programmed its
members to give a uniform response to a buyer's invitation to enter
into a transaction.
Predictably, where the cartel decision supplants decisions of the
individual member firm in such mc_1.tters as the number of products
to be produced,6 the price to be charged,7 or the allocation of transaction possibilities among sellers8 (by division of customers or terri3. "It is the basic premise of [§ 7 of the Clayton Act) ••• that competition 1vill be
most vital 'when there are many sellers, none of which has any significant market
share.'" United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 280 (1964) (Douglas,
J., quoting from United States v. Philadelphia Nat1 Bank, 874 U.S. 321, 363 (1963)).
4. 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
5. 874 U.S. 321 (1963).
6. Cf. Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 596 (1951).
7. Cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram&: Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
8. Cf. White Motor Co. v~ United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Addyston Pipe &: Steel
Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 241 (1899).
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tories), free competition is considered by the courts to have been displaced as a matter of law.
Another situation where a large number of sellers in a market
may give a false appearance of real choice among transaction opportunities is a market in which consumers, because of physical or
temporal limitations, can consider the goods or services of only a
few of the sellers. A submarket can illustrate such a situation, to
the extent that it does not involve a problem solely of market definition. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,9 the Supreme Court
emphasized the fact that well-defined geographic submarkets, such
as specific cities and their environs, may exist within broad markets.10
For example, there may be numerous shoe retailers in a particular
section of the country but only one having an outlet in a particular
town. Thus, when shoes are needed by consumers in that town and
transportation to other towns is not feasible, the consumers involved
have no effective choice of transaction partners.11
Situations also occur where consumers are confronted with a
large number of sellers in a given market but find it impractical to
give consideration to more_ than one or two sellers as potential transaction partners. Impulse items provide one example. A consumer
wishing to buy an item costing less than one tenth of one per cent of
his weekly income will be likely to buy it at the most convenient
location rather than to go out of his way to make a conscious choice
among sellers. Even a prospective buyer who is willing to shop for
a particular item may not have available the means to test and choose
among the large number of products presented for his choice. In
fact, his inadequacy to deal with a bewildering array of merchandise
may cause him to act irrationally rather than choosing rationally
from a limited sample of the products available.12
On the other hand, it is not always clear that the presence of only
a limited number of sellers in a market means that consumer -choices
are unacceptably limited. In fact, if there exist potential sellers
capable of easy and speedy entry into the market, even a single
seller may provide a consumer with an adequate choice of transaction opportunities. Most newsstands provide an example. A typical
newsstand serves a distinct market area, perhaps a single block, in
which it is the only seller. However, it provides an adequate choice
9. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
10. Id. at 336.

11. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 357 (1922),
where the Court recognized that small towns often cannot support more than one dis•
tributor of a particular line of products.
,

12. Cf.

CLARK, COMPETlTION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS

75-76, 241-42 (1961).
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of transaction opportunities to its customers because its failure to
perform as if effectively limited by competition, as by arbitrarily
raising prices (even slightly), will be likely to cause another seller
to invade its territory at once. Such potential competition adequately
serves the public need for competitively determined prices in both
markets and submarkets.
A second illustration of a few sellers providing an adequate
choice of transaction opportunities to consumers arises when large
firms P.roduce competing lines or competing products within a line. 18
Meat packers, for example, sell a variety of cuts from a variety of
animals, all cuts competing with one another. Food packers often
distribute a variety of products under different brand-names and at
different prices.14 Large shoe manufacturers provide another example, since they frequently organize into separate, competing selling divisions through which various brands and types of shoes are
marketed. In durable goods markets, the same seller as a matter
of course provides economy, standard, and deluxe models of his
product, thereby offering consumers three distinct transaction possibilities.

B. Buyer's Conscious Limitation of Transaction OpportunitiesThe Requirements Contract
The preceding examples include instances where consumers are
indifferent to a large number of sellers in a market because they find
that their needs for transaction opportunities are served adequately
by a few. There are still other situations where the correlation between the number of transaction partners and the welfare of particular buyers is very slight. In fact, certain types of buyers, including
many who buy for resale, need to limit their choice of transaction
partners severely, even to one, for long periods of time.
In Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,115 the electric company contracted to purchase its total requirements of coal for a
period of twenty years from a single source, thereby foregoing a
series of choices among other transaction partners for that period.
The Supreme Court sustained this limitation, pointing out that the
contract resulted in economic advantage to the buyer. 10 The Court
also noted that the requirements contract guaranteed a constant flow
13. See, e.g., OXENFELDT, INDUSTRIAL PRICING AND MARKET PRACTICES 372-75 (1951).
14. See Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 .F,2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.
WEEK 3117 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1965).
15. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
16. Id. at 334.
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of coal to the utility's boilers for a period long enough to permit
long-term planning to meet the needs of the utility's customers.17
Thus, the buyer's decision to substitute an assured supply of coal
for unlimited choice of transaction partners was considered permissible, especially where an offsetting benefit to the utility and to its
customers was apparent. However, to achieve the end of protecting
the consumer interest in the transaction, the Court had to engage in
manipulative definition of the relevant market.18
Permitting decisions by buyers to limit their freedom of choice
of transaction partners, by entering exclusive dealing arrangements
or by agreeing to purchase requirements for a substantial period of
time from a single seller, is fully consistent with reliance upon competition as the market regulator. The basic function of competition
is to provide buyers with freedom of choice among transaction partners to the end that buyers realize their values. This is a freedom
which includes the right to decline periodic exercise of choice, where
such a course of conduct is desirable for the purpose of value
realization. 19
l

II.

EMPHASIS ON CONSUMER INTEREST: A RECOMMENDED APPROACH

The above situations demonstrate the invalidity of the assumption that highly pluralistic competition should in all cases be the
ideal model for purposes of public control of business. The thesis of
this article, however, does not stop at this point. It is submitted that
the ideal of economic action for purposes of antitrust control should
be a system which: (I) provides means for consumers to realize their
values through choice among the widest possible range of products
and services; (2) results in goods and ·services being offered by suppliers with the greatest economy of means and at prices determined
by effective competition, which is not necessarily highly pluralistic
competition; and (3) produces a framework where the ultimate goal
is the development of the consumer as an individual and a personality instead of satisfying the marginal wants of the economists'
abstract model of a buyer. Antitrust control should be concerned
with the consumer interest. The structure of the market is only one
aspect of the problem of achieving that goal, and attainment· of the
economists' goal of a perfect market structure should not be reached
17. Ibid.
18. See text accompanying notes 52 and 53 infra.
19. Good reasons for declining periodic exercise of choice might include, in addition
to an assured source of supply, a promise of an exclusive franchise or the benefits to
be derived from integration into a dealer system including accounting and advertising
direction, employee training programs, group insurance, and other similar benefits.

782

:Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 64:777

at the expense of the consumer. Accordingly, the issues for antitrust
control should be: Do the questioned market relationships provide
adequate means for consumer value realization by innovation, market research, choice of products and services, efficient use of means,
and price reductions corresponding to savings in costs? Is there sufficient competition to ensure that this kind of market performance
will be maintained? Would compulsory movement toward a more
pluralistic market structure result in any substantial improvement
in market performance from the standpoint of the foregoing criteria?
Antitrust control is thus confronted with the question whether
the interests of consumers will be better served by restructuring
markets which have few sellers or by permitting such markets to
operate in a concentrated state. Two kinds of consumption in
today's organization of industry force such a posing of alternatives
for decision: government consumption and the consumption of the
"affluent" consumer.
Government is at present a "super consumer" which wants space
conquered, poverty eliminated, and racial economic inequality eradicated. Such wants are different both in degree and in kind from the
consumer wants which direct the classical economic competitive
model. No combination of consumers having the requisite wealth,
other than the federal government, could be expected to agree to
exchange it for pictures of Mars. However, such demands are being
made by the super consumer. Moreover, the "super demands" of
government are calling for the combination of quantities of men,
materials, and machines into producing units which would not·
otherwise come into being. For example, the federal government,
through its Chief Executive, recently announced that the United
States will parallel its lunar landing program with a program exploring the military potential of men in space.20
It seems apparent that the demands of the Government for such
items as manned orbiting laboratories are capable of satisfaction
only by producing units the output of which will appear in the
somewhat distant future. Such units have vast reservoirs of specialists and vast accumulations of capital, and are directed by professional managers with due regard for the interests of consumers, labor, stockholders, and the public. Producing units of this sort were
labeled "metrocorporations"' by Richard Eells.21 Fragmentation of
industry_so as to leave no seller with an organization capable of satis-

20. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 26, 1965, p. 2, col. 2.
21. See generally EEu.s, THE MEANING OF MODERN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF, LARGE CORPORATE ENTERPRISE (1960),

BUSINESS: AN INTRODUCTION TO

.
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fying the demands of the super consumer is politically and economically unacceptable, particularly when those demands fall in the category of defense. Similarly, to require the super. consumer to deal
always with multiple sources of supply seems unacceptable, if to do
so is inefficient or not in accord with the preferences of the super
consumer.
A setting in which a super consumer demands, among other
things, the immediate bridging of space and the systematic elimination of poverty signals evolution from an economy of scarcity toward
an economy based on affluence and having an increasing and substantial number of individual consumers possessed of varying degrees
of affluence. With respect to the latter group of constantly expanding
affluent consumers, each with an expanding capacity to demand satisfaction of non-physical needs,22 the economic and social task for the
community will become more one of responding to individual desires
and less one of producing from scarce resources a series of basic
goods in sufficient quantity. In other words, if the affluent consumer
in a competitive economy appears in sufficient numbers, he is less
likely to be perceived by producers as simply a unit in a homogeneous mass; he is more likely to be perceived in terms of his individual personality.
The adjustment of the economy to the needs of such a society will
demand something more than Adam Smith's ideal of many sellerssmall business unit&:-in a market as the optimal mode of economic
organization. Production on a small scale cannot satisfy many of
the demands of space-age consumers responding to stimuli from
laboratories producing new advances in technology and new scientific
discoveries. Some of the demands generated by affluent space-age
consumers, whether for natural gas, communications satellites, computers, or atomic kitchen, will, like the demands of the super consumer, be capable of satisfaction only by producing units with the
capacity of a metrocorporation.
This is not, of course, to suggest that smaller producing units
designed to fulfill small segments of demand will not remain a
vital force in the future. Similarly, those persons charged with preserving to the economy the benefits of competition must continue
to be concerned with the structure of markets. However, the foregoing observations ~hould suggest that conceivably the nature of the
demands of the affluent consumers of the future, along with the nature of the demands of the super-consumer, require the presence in
22. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 1965 CCH
(S.D. Cal. 1964), prob. furls. noted, 282 U.S. 806 (1965).

TRADE
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the market of super producers. It is also suggested that agencies
charged with maintaining competition should adopt a perspective
in addition to that of the neo-classic model of highly pluralistic competition in order that an opportunity might be preserved for the
timely growth and development of such super producers.
Ill. THE

SUPREME COURT'S CONTINUING INSISTENCE ON
PLURALISTIC COMPETITION

If recent Supreme Court pronouncements provide a guide, the
trend in the enforcement of competition is toward increasing and
exclusive reliance upon a pluralistic model of a competitive market
-one with many sellers, preferably independent and locally ownedagainst which to measure challenged marketing arrangements. In
the Brown Shoe case, for example, the Supreme Court construed
section 7 of the Clayton Act to prohibit a merger of two corporations the result of which was an enterprise both manufacturing
shoes and selling a large portion of its output through wholly owned
or controlled retail outlets.23 The merger was condemned as reflecting an undue tendency toward concentration of economic power in
the hands of a few sellers in the markets for men's, women's, and
children's shoes.
The shoe industry, at the time the Court was analyzing it, had
over eight hundred shoe manufacturers; it thus had a market structure "as close to pure competition as is possible outside a classroom
model." 24 Nevertheless, the Court was convinced that the number
of competitors was being systematically reduced by a series of
mergers. Apparently the Court became convinced that a market
structure comprising eight hundred manufacturers of shoes is economically more desirable than one involving any lesser number,
although it would seem that as few as fifty competitors would provide
a market structure in which competition would be an effective
regulator.
The Court also relied upon a pluralistic norm in analyzing the
vertical aspects of the Brown Shoe acquisition. There, too, a trend
among shoe manufacturers to acquire control of existing retail outlets was given as the basis for invalidating the acquisition. The Court
emphasized the fact that the merger created "a large national chain
which is integrated with a manufacturing operation,"25 and pointed
out that "the retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating
23. See 370 U.S. at 297.
24. Bork &· Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 363, 371 (1965).
25. 370 U.S. at 344.
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wholesalers and by increasing the volume of purchases from the
manufacturing division of the enterprise, can market their own
brands at prices below those of competing independent retailers." 26
Thus the Court recognized that the effect of its decision was to deny
consumers the benefit of lower prices resulting from th~ economies
of vertical integration, in favor of retention of businesses which
would otherwise be excluded as the result of price competition.
The Philadelphia Bank case further illustrates a tendency on the
part of the Supreme Court to rely predominantly upon a pluralistic
concept of competition to evaluate the economic consequences of
challenged business growth. In that case the Court announced that
combinations of sellers having an aggregate market share of thirty per
cent were presumed to be economically unacceptable.27 The record
before the Court indicated rather clearly that the merger of the
nvo banks involved would be beneficial to one class of customersthose who sought commercial banking services in regional, national,
and international markets. On the other hand, the majority of the
customers served by the nvo banks were motivated in their demand
for banking services in considerable measure by shopping convenience in the area in which the banks were located. The merger did
not diminish the amount of banking facilities, since the new institution continued to provide deposit account facilities to all consumers desiring them, as had each of the merged institutions. Moreover, a choice among a substantial number of competitors still
remained.
For one group, the loss of one potential partner for banking
transactions was more than offset by the prospect of dealing with
one bank with loan limits nearly double the limit of either of its
two predecessors.28 For the other group, there were no additional
usable services forthcoming from the resulting bank which were not
provided prior to the merger by both of the two combining banks,
and there was no evidence that the character of such banking services would be changed as a result of the merger. The Court, consistent with the express language in the Clayton Act invalidating
26. Ibid.
Z/. See 374- U.S. at 364-65.
28. Lending limits are both actual and psychological barriers to banking transactions. Of course a· bank must observe its limit, but "smaller" banks may hesitate to
approach their limits with any single customer or small group of customers, because
to do so would tie up a disproportionate percentage of funds in a few customers. In
addition, customers, in borrowing, apparently prefer not to approach a bank's limits;
thus, a client with a need to borrow $5 million would prefer to deal with a'bank with
$10 million limits rather than a bank with $5 million or $6 million limits. Brief for
Appellees, pp. 70-78, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374- U.S. 321 (1963).
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conduct having anticompetitive effects in any line of commerce in
any section of the country,29 and consistent with the Court's o·wn
policy dating from Brown Shoe of analyzing the effects of market
action in sub-markets, ignored the gains to large customers accustomed to dealing regionally, nationally, and internationally, and
invalidated the merger because of presumed effects in the fourcounty area in which the banks involved had offices. The Court also
ignored the beneficial effects upon the economy of the community
which such regional, national, and international growth, as well as
growth in assets of the bank, might produce.30 "We are clear," said
the Court, "that a merger the effect of which 'may be substantially to
lessen competition' is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning
of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial."31 This is indeed an extraordinary confession.
In a series of cases coming before the Court after the Philadelphia
Bank case, determinative significance was attached to the number
of actual or potential competitors in the market. In United States v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co.,32 the Court invalidated an acquisition of
one natural gas supplier by another and ordered divestiture, without
ever indicating how many sellers were actual or potential competitors for the "new increments of demand" in the expanding California
market for the industrial and household use of gas.83 The record
clearly indicated that the two merged firms were in fact effective
competitors for business in the California market, and apparently
29. Clayton Act § 7 provides in part: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall
acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly•
• • ." 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
30. Some relevant economic factors pointing to the propriety of analyzing bank
mergers in light of regional markets include .the fact that the price of money is deter•
mined regionally within a national context, and that most borrowers have little bargaining power over the rate of interest. A third factor is the advantages which a large
bank offers to a region and community from the standpoint of the amount and char•
acter of its services. There is in this sense a community interest which should not be
ignored (although it has been) in bank merger cases.
31. 374 U.S. at 371.
32. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
33. Apparently designating the number of competitors was difficult. The district
court felt that EI Paso had no competition from non-California producers. The Government felt that there were four potential competitors, apparently because in the
period after the acquisition four companies were seeking certificates of public con•
venience and necessity to supply the California market. The appellees, while not con•
ceding that El Paso itself was an effective actual competitor for the California market,
pointed out that there were in existence many more than four firms that would like
to supply the California market and therefore many more potential competitors than
the four companies pointed out by the Government. See Brief for Appellees, pp. 3437, United States v. EI Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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the elimination of this competition-the reduction of the number of
sellers by one-was in itself deemed an unacceptable threat to the
continued functioning of the competitive mechanism in the market
involved.84
The decisions in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.,85
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,86 and the Lexington
Bank case were similar to the result in El Paso. In Penn-Olin the
Court vacated a judgment against the Government in a case where
the latter had shmm, at best, that two potential competitors had
entered a market jointly. The joint venture at most reduced the
total number of potential competitots by two, while adding one
actual competitor to the market. Of course, a threat to con;ipetition
could be found in such circumstances if there had been an extremely
small number of actual and potential sellers, but the Government
presented no information concerning the total number of competitors.
In the Lexington Bank case, on ,the other hand, market statistics
were gathered and made available. These statistics indicated that
the challenged activity was a merger by the largest and fourth largest
banks in a six-bank market. The Court nevertheless chose to emphasize that "where merging companies are major competitive factors
in a relevant market, the elimination of significant competition
between them, by merger or consolidation, itself constitutes a violation of § I of the Sherman Act." 87 The decision, in terms .of statutory
language, was that the union of the two banks amounted to an
unreasonable restraint of trade. This is something more than a
probable substantial lessening of competition, and also represents
something more than the Court said occurred in Penn-Olin.
The remaining case in this series, Alcoa, involved vertical integration achieved through the acquisition in 1959 of the Rome Cable
Corporation by Alcoa. Alcoa produced aluminum, and both companies manufactured aluminum conductor. In the year prior to
34. In El Paso, as in the Philadelphia Bank case, another government agency not
directly charged with maintaining cm;npetition had approved the transaction prior to
the Supreme Court's contrary action. In Philadelphia Bank the Comptroller of the
Currency, acting under the Bank Merger Act of 1960, 73 Stat. 463 (1959), 12 U.S.C. § 215
(1964), approved the merger, reasoning that an adequate number of banks remained in
Philadelphia after the merger to serve the local area so that local customers were not
deprived by the merger of the benefits of competition and that the beneficial effects
of the consolidation upon international and national competition more than justified
its approval. In El Paso the Federal Power Commission had approved the acquisition as
being in the public interest.
85. 878 U.S. 158 (1964). On .remand, the distrlc~ court dismissed the complaint.
United. States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965).
86. 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
.
.
37. 876 U.S. at 671-7.2".
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the merger, Alcoa was the leading producer of aluminum conductor
with 27.8 per cent of the market; Rome captured 1.3 per cent of the
market that year. In 1959, there were more than twenty-nine producers of aluminum conductor, but by 1963 this number, for practical purposes, had been reduced to about nventy-three.88 In the
latter year, five of the six producers of aluminum ingot also produced
aluminum conductor, and the sixth was considering acquiring facilities for the production of conductor.89 Finally, in 1963 Aluminium,
Ltd., a Canadian corporation, announced the acquisition of Central
Cable, one of the largest independent producers of conductor; this
merger capped a series of acquisitions of independent conductor producers by such ingot producers as Anaconda, Olin, Kaiser, Alcoa,
and Reynolds. Accordingly, it seemed clear that the bulk of conductor production in the future would be by integrated producers.
In the face of evidence that, as a result of the merger, Rome was
functioning quite efficiently as a distributor for Alcoa-as part of
a metrocorporation-and in the face of clear evidence that the role
of the independent could not be competitively meaningful in a
market already dominated by integrated producers, the Court
nevertheless reassigned to Rome (to its undoubted displeasure) the
task of buying from Alcoa, Reynolds, and Kaiser the aluminum with
which to make conductor to sell in competition with these three
integrated producers. In justification, the Court restated that "it is
the basic premise . . . that competition will be most vital 'when
there are many sellers, none of which has any significant market
share.' " 40 Similarly, the Court concluded that "Rome seems to us
the prototype of the small independent that Congress aimed to preserve . . . ." 41 The achievement of tlie economies of vertical integration for the benefit of consumers was ignored. The competitive
effectiveness of Alcoa was temporarily diminished by the loss of
a distributing arm, which was remolded into the form of an independent producer of uncertain _competitive effectiveness and facing problems of higher cost in a market dominated by integrated
producers.42
The Supreme Court, in sum, seems clearly committed to a policy
38. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 18-24, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
377 U.S. 271 (1964).
39. Id. at 23 n.17.
40. 377 U.S. at 280 (quoting from United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 874 U.S.
321, 363 (1963)).
41. Id. at 281.
42. Obviously Alcoa has the resources to increase its conductor operations by capital
expansion, and, if the record in the case is to be believed, it will probably do so. As
the other ingot producers integrate forward and bring competitive pressures to bear
upon one another, Rome Cable will be squeezed. If Rome is neither acquired by
another ingot producer nor in a position to integrate backward, it is conceivable that
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of measuring challenged marketing arrangements against a highly
pluralistic competitive norm. The utilization of sub-markets as foci
for analysis in Brown Shoe and Alcoa,43 the refusal, in Philadelphia
Bank, to permit economic gains in some markets to offset a mere
reduction of the number of firms in another as a result of the merger,
the emphasis on the elimination of competitors as the criterion of
legal control in El Paso, Alcoa, and Penn-Olin, and the mechanistic
approach of Philadelphia Bank all indicate the advent of a period
.of regulation of competition based on the mechanical application
of a norm of highly pluralistic markets.
Moreover, the Court's resort to this norm, coupled with its
evident determination to weed out potentially anticompetitive activities in their incipiency and its tendency to measure the effects of
such activities in narrow lines of commerce or in submarkets, indicates an atmosphere hostile to the growth and development of the
metrocorporation, even under conditions of effective competition.
The mechanistic interdiction of corporate growth denies consideration of economic justifications for market activity in general, when
they are offered in opposition to the ideal of the fragmented market.
In addition, reliance by the Court, especially in the Philadelphia
Bank opinion, upon the formula that Congress intended to maintain competition by maintaining large numbers of small, independent sellers, indicates that the Court is inclined to take an inflexible
position with regard to economic regulation, on the theory that it is
the inexorable terms of a statute it is applying rather than an economy it is regulating.
IV.

EFFEGr OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
ON OTHER TRIBUNALS

The impact of the decision by the Supreme Court to rely heavily
on a norm of highly pluralistic competition is of course magnified
because of the Court's position of leadership among the governit will be pressured out of the field. The net result of the Supreme Court decree may
be to deny Rome shareholders an opportunity to liquidate their investment at a time
when adequate compensation was available, to deny to Rome management an opportunity to upgrade Rome's performance by joining,a metrocorporation, and to deny the
use of the Rome assets to the persons most eager and able to exploit them. Cf. Oppenheim, Small and Big Business: Orientation of Antitrust Points and Counterpoints, 39
U. DET. L.J. 155, 162 (1961); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clay•
ton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1313 (1965).
.
43. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 809 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1962), where the court
emphasized that Brown Shoe permits the utilization of sub-markets and does not re•
quire resort to the outer limits of markets definable in terms of product characteristics
or end uses. See also Ekco Prods. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965). In the latter
case the court upheld an FTC order of divestiture running_ against the principals in a
conglomerate merger, although there were no markets in which the acquired and
acquiring companies actually competed prior to the acquisition.
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mental bodies . concerned with economic regulation. In fact, the
major impact of the Brown Shoe and Philadelphia Bank opinions in
future litigation will occur in the lower federal courts and in the
decisions of the Federal Trade Commission. Two cases will suffice
to illustrate this point.
. In Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 44 the Commission dissolved a
vertical integration by ordering divestiture by Reynolds of Arrow
Brands, a converter of aluminum foil which sold to florist supply
houses. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed, relying upon the Brown Shoe concept of sub-markets to find
that florist foil formed a product sub-market in the general market
for converted aluminum foil. This definitional exercise enabled the
court to distinguish eight converters of foil for the florist trade from
among two hundred converters of foil for other uses.
Arrow sold about one third of the foil purchased by florist supply
houses in 1956. The acquisition of Arrow by Reynolds foreclosed
Reynolds' competitors from serving Arrow as a customer, though the
facilities of Arrow continued to serve Arrow's customers. The court
stated:
The truer picture of anticompetitive effect emerges [when one
views the post-acquisition posture of the eight converters of foil
for the florist trade]- ... Arrow's assimilation into Reynolds'
enormous capital structure and resources gave Arrow an immediate advantage over its competitors who were contending
for a share of the market for florist foil. The power of the "deep
pocket" or "rich parent" for one of the florist foil suppliers in
a competitive group when previously no company was very
large . . . opened the possibility and power to sell at prices
approximating cost or below and thus to undercut and ravage
the less affiuent competition.45
The court concluded by noting that the FTC had adequately demonstrated the likelihood of a harmful effect by showing that after the
acquisition Arrow had in fact provided foil at lower prices.
The decision seems quixotic. The court protected the public
from the ravages of efficiency by preserving competition in a market
which could well be eliminated entirely from the standpoint of
efficient use of resources. Foil converters merely buy large rolls of
foil from producers, break the rolls down into small lots, and sell
the product to small purchasers. Converters came into existence only
because in the early stage of developing the market for foil, foil
producers preferred not to sell in small lots. If the foil producers had
decided in the beginning to sell in small lots, the need for con44. !109 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

· 45. Id. at 229-80.
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verters would never have arisen. Eventually Reynolds began backtracking and preparing to supply all users of foil, both large and
small. However, when it did so by acquiring the assets of Arrow and
eliminating the converter's profit margin from the price of foil
to small users, it was found to be acting illegally. Of course, if
Reynolds duplicates Arrow's facilities there will be no illegality.
There will be only a needless waste of. resources and a needless
denial to Arrow of the proceeds of the sale of its business.
Ekco Products Co. v. FTC 46 is the second example of the impact
in the lower courts of the Supreme Court's announced preference for
pluralism in competition. In that case Ekco, a large diversified enterprise of the sort which is a potential .entrant in many markets, acquired the McCI.intock Company. Ekco had no familiarity with
McClintock's business of manufacturing and distributing commercial meat-handling equipment; the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit therefore characterized the merger as conglomerate. Throughout most of its history, McClintock had had a virtual monopoly position. After the acquisition, McClintock began receiving some competition, but eventually it bought out its most effective competitor,
which, it must be stated, probably entered the field improvidently
and certainly left it willingly.
With respect to McClintock, the main impact of the acquisition
was to relieve it and its management of a stifling loan agreement, to
place it in a financial position to be creative and innovative, and,
as the court tirelessly emphasized, to permit -it to buy out its most
effective competitor. The overall effect of the acquisition, however,
was that a small business severely hampered with chronic cash shortages was given a degree of financial independence and a resulting
flexibility in meeting the changing demands of space-age consumers
by joining forces ·with a larger, diversified organization; yet divesti-:ture was ordered.47
V.

DECEPTIVE BASES UNDERLYING GENERAL PROHIBITORY RULES

As Professor Turner has pointed out, general norms such as the
thirty per cent rule of Philadelphia Bank, the rule that it is illegal to
foreclose a substantial share of the market, or, for that matter, the
rule that effective competition requires a fragmented market are justified if one can conclude that the consequences of being wrong
about the probable results of applying such rules are less serious than
46. 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
47. For a contrary analysis in a somewhat similar situation, see Smith-Victor Corp.
v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. ill. 1965).

792

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 64:777

the consequences of adopting no rule whatever.48 It seems clear that
the Court has in fact made the judgment that unyielding and early
application of a pluralistic norm to marketing arrangements to halt
the development of "unacceptable" market structures will benefit
the general public, even though in concrete cases it may not benefit
consumers.
In addition, several other justifications for general prohibitory
rules are occasionally offered. First, it is felt that a liberal dose of
pluralism by present governmental policy makers Gudges) will avoid
a need for economic planning in the future. 40 Second, it is said willingness on the part of the Court to halt a trend before it starts is in
some sense a necessary reaction to the judiciary's traditional reluctance to break up market power once it is acquired. 00 Third, it is assumed decision-making under general prohibitory rules requires less
evidence and consequently less of the time of government attorneys,
so that a wider enforcement of the antitrust laws becomes possible.
A related justification is thought to be that general prohibitory rules
infuse a desirable increment of certainty and predictability into antitrust enforcement.
The notion that pervasive interference by courts to preserve
fragmented markets serves not only an economic goal but also the
higher social goal of preserving a self-policing system free of an
abundance of supervisory political machinery is built on the premise
that, absent early interference, the inevitable economic progression
in an initially free society is from competition to monopoly, to regulation, and finally to socialization. It seems highly probable, however, that in reality most markets are at present self-policing systems
and that the pattern of structural changes is both multi-directional
and reciprocating, in the sense that price competition gives way to
parallel pricing, which in turn gives way to competition in innovation, which leads in turn to new price competition in the new products. Or the appearance of price parallelism may induce entry by a
diversified or vertically integrated corporation, resulting in cost cutting and price competition. In the event that the progression ever
leads to monopoly, duopoly, or an unacceptable form of oligopoly,
then interference by the courts to break up firms and fragment markets is justified.
48. See Turner, supra note 42, at 1319-20.
49. See Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 CoLUM, L. REv. 877 (1965).
50. See generally Dewey, The Economic Theory of Antitrust: Science or Religion7,
50 VA. L. REv. 413 (1964). Cases evidencing judicial hesitancy to break up firms include:
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp, 83!1
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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It appears probable, however, that the number of instances in
which self-policing systems break down completely is slight and that
the resources of the courts and the agencies are more· than adequate
to the task of handling those cases. The net result of withholding
interference until the competitive regulator breaks down completely
would be an enlargement of individual liberty, in the sense that
market forces are permitted to function without governmental interference until it becomes quite clear that the self-policing market
forces have been overcome, in which case there should be intervention of control to restore them.
The justification for general prohibitory rules based on notions
that antitrust enforcement will be rendered less time-consuming and
more predictable is even more illusory, for in the cases that signal
the decision to rely on a pluralistic norm there are equally probative
indicators which suggest that the key to Supreme Court action rests
with the definition of the relevant market in which challenged
activity will be measured.51 The power to define the relevant market
is in most· cases one that can be exercised . with considerable
latitude. Indeed, by resorting to an expansive definition of relevant
markets, the Court has left open the possibility of justifying, in a
particular case, a market arrangement which departs from the
pluralistic model.
In the Tampa Electric case, it will be recalled, 52 the buyer wished
to obligate itself by a :i;equirements contract to deal with a single
source of coal for a period of twenty years in order to reduce market
risk in the supply and price of its basic raw material and thereby
protect its capital investment and the consumers' interest. The total
consumption of coal in peninsular Florida was about 700,000 tons
per year-a quantity which approximated the 1959 requirements of
Tampa Electric. The effect of the contract was to preclude over seven
hundred coal producers who could serve that region from competing for nearly fifty per cent of the Florida market during a period
of nventy years. The lower courts ruled that the contract foreclosed
competition from a substantial share .of the Florida market for
coal and hence was unenforceable as a violation of the antitrust
Iaws.58
In view of its own rule that it is illegal per se to foreclose com51. Resort to mechanical rules of the type announced in Philadelphia Bank will
provoke increased attention to market definition by attorneys in counseling and
litigation and by courts. See Blake, Mergers and United States Anti-Trust l.Aw, 12 INT'L
&: COMP. L.Q. 78, 85, 94 (Supp. No. 6, 1963).
52. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
53. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 168 F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Tenn, 1958), afj'd,
276 F,2d 766 (6th Cir. 1960).
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petitors from any substantial share of a market, it appears that the
Supreme Court should hav~ affirmed the nullification of the contract. However, the Court noted the importance of the interest of the
utility company in having the assurance of a steady and ample supply
of coal for a long term. The Court apparently was unable to give
effect to this interest under any formal rule of law other than by
shifting the relevant market from that of competition among sellers
generally for Florida coal consumers to that of competition among
coal producers in Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky,
Tennessee, Alabama, Ohio, and Illinois-the states in which the coal
for Florida buyer~ originated. Only in this way could a contract
covering a substantial fifty per cent of the market consisting of coal
consumed in peninsular Florida be identified as an innocuous arrangement extending to an insubstantial 0.77 per cent of coal produced and sold in the Appalachian area market.
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court should be caught in a
vise of unrealistic rule formulation from which it can extricate itself
only by such manipulative techniques in selecting the relevant
market. Indeed, the pervasive rule that it is illegal per se to
preclude competitors from any substantial market prevented the
Court from concentrating on the heart of the problem before it-the
real economic or marketing interests involved. Only by shifting the
view of the relevant market from that of competition for buyers in
Florida to that of competition among sellers in the Appalachian
coal region and adjacent areas could the desirable marketing situation be allowed to survive the strictures of the Court-made law.
In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,G 4 a firm
holding a monopoly in a morning newspaper market used this
power to compel advertisers to buy space in its evening newspaper
by selling advertising only when it was placed in both publications.
Obviously, this requirement could be viewed as a foreclosure of
co:rµpeting newspapers from access to a substantial share of the
market. From the standpoint of sales of newspapers, there are two
separate markets: morning and evening. By evening, a morning
newspaper is virtually waste paper; no one will buy it. For this
reason, the publisher's "unit" advertising plan restrained purchasers
of advert~sing space from exercising free choice, since it represented
a use of the monopoly power in the morning newspaper market to
exert leverage in the evening market. Nevertheless, in holding for
54. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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the defendant the Court ignored the abuse of power in the ~orning
newspaper market and held that the relevant market was that of
advertising space in both morning and evening newspapers, in
which the Times-Picayune enjoyed only forty per cent of the sales.55
The interests of buyers of advertising space were simply overlooked,
since the methodology applied was one of searching for a rule of
decision in "market" terms rather than marketing relationships and
consumer interest.
Obviously, to the extent judicial decisions in this area turn primarily on market definition,58 they will also tum on non-economic
criteria. Thus, the acquisition by DuPont of a block of General
Motors stock was illegal because it foreclosed competition in the
market for automobile finishes and fabrics, 57 despite the fact that
manufacturers of finishes and fabrics for other purposes would appear to be potential short-run competitors.
Moreover, judicial definitions of markets are casuistic. The
judicial process has not yet had, and will not have even in the far
future, an opportunity to reduce the general concept of "relevant
market" to a tool which is workable in even a small percentage of
the instances to -which it applies. In the resulting system for maintaining competition, the acceptability of a particular form of market
activity turns on the definition of the market in terms of time,
space, product, or service. The flexibility provided by this system has
permitted the Supreme Court to rule that an acquisition by a food
processer of a manufacturer of dehydrated onion and dehydrated
garlic (a merger which the FTC regarded as a restraint on competition in both the dehydrated onion and dehydrated garlic markets)
could be measured in light of the market for dehydrated onion and
garlic.68 This system has also permitted courts to rule both that interindustry competition between glass and metal containers is sufficient
to warrant treating as a relevant market the combined glass and
metal container industries and all end uses for which they compete,59
and that Alcoa's control of the aluminum market could be deter55. Compare United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), where
the Court recognized the leverage which dominance in the market for first-run moving
pictures makes possible in exploiting the second-run market.
56. Many commentators suggest that the cases often tum exclusively on market
definition. See Blake, supra note 51; Handler & Robinson, The Supreme Court vs.
Corporate Mergers, 71 FORTUNE 165, 174 (Tan. 1965); Lanzillotti, Market Structure 'and
Antitrust Vulnerability, 8 ANTITRUST BuLL. 853, 859 (1963).
57. See United States v. E: I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
58. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 502 (1965).
_59. See United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964). See also Handler
&: Robinson, supra note 56, at 174.
·
·
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mined in terms of the production of virgin aluminum without
considering secondary or reclaimed material.60
'
The significance of market definition is nowhere better illustrated than in the Philadelphia Bank opinion. In that case the Court
had determined that commercial banking was the product market
in which to measure the challenged acquisition, although institutions other than commercial banks provide many similar services.
In defining the geographic limits of this market, the Court recognized
that the area in which the banks had their offices did not correspond
exactly to the area of competition, for although small depositors and
borrowers were likely to find themselves confined to their neighborhood by the nature of the banking business and their own lack of
mobility, large borrowers and depositors often transacted banking
business at locations other than their home community. 61 The Court
also noted:
[T]hat in banking the relevant geographical market is a
function of each separate customer's economic scale means
simply that a workable compromise must bB found: some fair
intermediate delineation which avoids the indefensible extremes of drawing the market either so expansively as to make
the effect of the merger upon competition seem insignificant,
because only the very largest bank customers are taken into
account in defining the market, or so narrowly as to place appellees in different markets, because only the smallest customers
are considered.62

In other words, there had to be a market which was the market for
decision-making purposes, and that market was to be defined on the •
basis of a "workable compromise" or "some fair intermediate
delineation." Apparently the possibility of a market analysis which
would reveal the best means of promoting the consumer and community interest did not occur to the Court, which permitted the
outcome to tum on the impact of the merger upon only one class
of consumers served by the bank.
Market definition is an extremely flexible tool in the hands of
a court-so flexible, in fact, that the apparent certainty and predictability of result which might be expected to flow from the
mathematical measure of the Philadelphia Bank case is rendered
meaningless by the unpredictable discretion of a judge. Market
60. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). But

see the district court opinion on the remedy, United States v. Aluminum Co, of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
61. See 374 U.S. at 359 n.36, 360 n.37, 361.
62. Id. at 361. (Emphasis added.)
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definition is a requisite of antitrust analysis, but it should proceed
in as scientific and dispassionate a manner as possible, without
becoming a manipulative instrument for the covert achievement of
some other unexpressed goal. The totality of the market impact of
questioned marketing arrangements should be examined, and the
tendency of such arrangements to promote economical utilization
of resources and the consumer interest should be weighed. Finally,
the reasoning processes of the judge should be open, explicit, and
directly related to the problem which he considers crucial.
VI.

SUMMING

UP

A. Constructive Nonintervention
When the interests of an industry, as well as the maintenance of
pluralistic competition, demand consideration by regulatory agencies,
the result is frequently the creation of specialized agencies such as
the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal Communications Commission. The interests of labor and of corporate stockholders are safeguarded by other equally specialized administrative
agencies. However, the peculiar province and function of antitrust
regulation is to secure the consumer interest, and the ultimate
value of such regulation is maximum consumer welfare. 63 If .a particular market situation is providing substantial consumer value
realization, then there is no basis for interfering on the ground that
it does not reflect highly pluralistic competition, unless it can be
clearly demonstrated that such interference will result in consumer
or other values superior to those currently provided. Where the
challenged marketing arrangement is the result of corporate growth
by acquisition or merger, indications that increased value realization
is likely to be provided include the achievement of economies of
vertical integration, the achievement of a corporate structure which
enables the production of a diverse but related group of better, or
less costly, products, and the development of an organization which
permits research, innovation, efficiencies in production and marketing, and intelligent, informed decision making-the achievement,
in short, of corporate growth which is capable of better market
performance and greater consumer satisfaction.
The foregoing justifications for corporate acquisitions and
mergers are stated in terms of consumer-want satisfaction, and are
63. As Professor Bork has pointed out, if competition were the ultimate value, policy would require the atomization of society to the point of forbidding partnerships.
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division,
74 YALE L.J. 775, 832 (1965).
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siµrilar to the performance justifications listed by Judge Wyzanski
in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.64 Such standards
of performance permit a particular market or marketing arrangement to be evaluated not in terms of the abstract proposition that
a market populated with many small sellers will lead to maximized
consumer welfare, but rather in terms of the pragmatic proposition
that a particular arrangement has increased, is increasing, or will
increase consumer welfare. This method of evaluation requires that
if a particular marketing arrangement is performing well, it should
be permitted to continue to. operate; it also requires that the application of an abstract postulate of economic .theory be withheld
until the arrangement fails to provide the desired consumer satisfactions. Moreover, this method requires that, until it falters, the
agencies charged with maintaining competition should be content
with increasing value realization, and should withhold the question
whether present consumer satisfaction is at the optimum leveI.0G
B. Suggestions for Positive Regulation
In the final analysis, it is not markets which should be the
primary concern of those charged with maintaining competition, but
instead the performance of business organizations in maximizing
consumer values. The goal of maximizing consumer values is in
tum one which can be defined in concrete terms only when it is
placed in context with a number of other goals. Indeed, the goal
should not be maximum value realization, but rather optimum value
realization.
The ideal system for purposes of antitrust regulation is one
that seeks to achieve an optimum combination of two variables.
The first of these variables is the action of business organizations in
searching for consumer values, in shaping their products and
services to enable the realization of consumer values, and in reducing
costs and passing the benefit on to consumers. The second variable
is the charac.ter of competition in the relevant market. There should
l;>e no insistence that an oligopolistic market be changed to a
pluralistic market when current performance by sellers in the
market is marked by innovation, efficiency, and orientation to the
interests of consumers. While the maintenance of competitive
64. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
65. To judge the defects of a marketing arrangement and neglect its virtues, and
to judge its defects by what would supposedly happen under perfect competition, "is
not only npt feasible but is, in terms of a present-day economy, meaningless," CLARK,
COMPEI'ITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS 214 (1961).

March 1966]

Antitrust· and the Consumer Interest

799

markets remains a sine qua non of public control, this goal cannot
be conceived in mechanistic terms as a complete end in itself.
Instead, the search must be for the optimal practical combination
of performance in promoting consumer value realization and growth
of personality on the one hand, and free competition in free markets
on the other hand. Decisions should be macle on the basis of a
balancing of the totality of interests of consumers in the several
markets and sub-markets affected, and should not tum solely on
the impact of arrangements in a single sub-market affecting merely
a small minority of consumers. Means other than condemning arrangements in their entirety should be found for protecting the
interests of those consumers.
C. Conclusion

The assumption that all is well with the world when competitive
markets are preserved ignores the reality that the vitality of the
American economy is a product of many forces and that its preservation and growth cannot be left to so simple a formula. The extraordinary accomplishments of the American economy are a product
of the pragmatic philosophy of the American way of life: means are
judged by their consequences. The metrocorporation-a mechanism
for value realization by important segments of our: society, not
merely by its "o,;vners"-is the dominant actor in our economic life.
Markets are more frequently oligopolistic than not, at least for the
bulk of our national production of manufactured goods. This kind
of an economy was brought into being and continues to develop
because it provides the kind of world that we want. We like the
satisfactions it brings to labor, stockholders, management, and
consumers, as well as to the public at large.
To attempt to establish the model of highly pluralistic competition as the ideal model for purposes of public policy and decision
making is to substitute a crude symbolic representation for a complex reality. Moreover, the model shunts to the periphery of vision
the realities of corporate performance and consumer values. We do
not necessarily need the large corporation that is a jerry-built structure
of enterprises selected for tax advantages or bargain-basement acquisition costs. However, we do need metrocorporations (1) embodying a diversity of enterprises that possess a common unity or mission
and an ability to add strength to one another, (2) having the goal
of growth by serving the consumer and other group interests which
take part in its system of action, and (3) serving as potential· entrants
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in a multitude of markets, including markets having significant
barriers to entry for ordinary firms.
The antitrust laws should not be used to strike down corporate
growth resulting in greater efficiency and creativity in serving
consumers, so long as effective competition remains. Until recently,
competitors were allowed to achieve through merger the economies
of vertical integration and mass production, together with the
benefits in innovation flowing from research of the magnitude which
only large-scale enterprise can support. The image of our economy
as one of business organizations so structured and managed as to
serve the consumer interest to the greatest possible degree, yet subject
to competition in free markets, should be the ideal image for antitrust law enforcement. Such a structure of competition has greater
importance for consumers and, indeed, for the vitality and growth
of our economy, than the goal of fragmenting competitors into large
numbers of small units.

